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    Abstract 
This paper explores the consequences of financial liberalization policy on the 
banking sector in Bangladesh. Following a motivating portfolio selection theoretical 
model on the impact of liberalization, it applies time series techniques with annual 
banking sector data for the period, FY1981-2008. The study suggests that the main 
objective of financial liberalization to promote domestic private savings by raising 
real interest rates has not worked. No significant positive correlation is observed 
between domestic private savings and the real deposit interest rate. Furthermore, 
financial liberalization has not improved the efficiency of the banking institutions 
since high intermediation costs and interest rate spreads still persist.  
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1. Introduction 
Financial liberalization continues to be an important issue in the literature on 
economic reform in the context of present global financial crisis, and the 
nationalization and rescue initiatives by advanced economies with a view to 
restoring confidence in the banking and financial system. Against this 
backdrop, question marks are being raised regarding the wisdom of the 
deregulation of the financial sector. Therefore, it is timely to re-examine the 
effect of financial liberalization in developing countries, particularly in terms of 
its stated objectives of promoting domestic private savings and the efficient 
allocation of financial resources. 
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Financial deepening and increased financial intermediation has been 
identified as one of the crucial factors that could promote growth in 
developing countries; see Levine (1997) for example. Levine (1997) explains 
the theoretical interrelations between savings, investment, financial markets 
and economic growth, where financial institutions mobilize savings, allocate 
resources leading to capital accumulation and technological innovation, 
culminating in increased economic growth. Therefore, Levine points to two 
channels through which financial functions may affect economic growth: 
capital accumulation and technological innovation. The important point is that 
well functioning financial institutions can raise the fraction of total savings 
devoted to investment and avoid premature liquidation of capital. Salient to 
this process is the efficient allocation of investment through various channels, 
chief among which is the belief that banking sector intermediation provides a 
more useful avenue for promoting growth enhancing investment.  
The evidence regarding financial liberalization augmenting the level of 
formal sector private savings in developing countries is mixed; see Fry (1995) 
for a survey. A study of eight Asian countries, reported in Fry (1995), casts 
doubts on the interest elasticity of saving being significantly positive. Similarly, 
Gupta (1987) arrives at a similar conclusion from his analysis of 22 Asian and 
Latin American countries over the 1967-76 period. A study by World Bank on 
the impact of financial reforms in five Asian countries, where reform 
programmes were initiated in the late 1970s (Malaysia in 1978, Sri Lanka in 
1977, Philippines in 1980, Indonesia in 1983 and Korea in 1981-82) and three 
Latin American countries (Chile in 1974, Argentina in 1976 and Uruguay in 
1976) concludes that the relationship between savings and the rising real 
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interest rate following financial liberalization is at best ambiguous (Cho and 
Khatkhate 1989). A more recent estimate for Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand 
found that the national savings ratio increased (on average) in the long run by 
0.1 percentage point for each 1 percentage point increase in real deposit 
interest rate (Fry, 1995), but the magnitude is not large enough to warrant 
much policy significance. The increased proximity of depository institution 
branches seems to have exerted a substantial influence on national saving ratios 
by increasing rural savings, notably in Sri Lanka (Fry, 1995).  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of financial sector 
liberalization in Bangladesh. Our contention is that even if financial 
liberalization increases the number and branches of private sector banks and 
induces greater financial deepening (the ratio of broad money over GDP), its 
ultimate success lies in augmenting formal sector saving, and increases in the 
quality and volume of banking or financial intermediation. This will depend 
crucially on portfolio choices of wealth holders, who in an uncertain 
environment may choose to still stick to real and unofficial assets despite rising 
bank deposit rates. To that end we employ time series techniques to gauge the 
effect on savings of financial liberalization, as well as analyze the stylised facts 
of banking efficiency. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 
contains the theoretical framework for the analysis. Section 3 provides the 
model specification and estimation of the savings function in Bangladesh. 
Section 4 explains the consequences of financial liberalization policy for 
banking efficiency in Bangladesh. Finally, section 5 concludes.  
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2. Theoretical framework 
Until the 1960s, the dominant view in the finance and growth literature was 
Keynesian, arguing that interest rates ought to be kept low in order to promote 
capital formation (Sen and Vaidya 1997). During this period, the guiding 
philosophy of governments in many developing countries was one of 
economic planning with directed credit programmes and interest rate controls. 
These became popular as a means of allocating scarce resources to ‘preferred 
sectors’ at low cost. 
This dominant theoretical position was challenged by Ronald McKinnon 
(1973) and Edward Shaw (1973). They termed most developing economies as 
“financially repressed”. They described financial repression – indiscriminate 
“distortions of financial prices including interest rates and foreign-exchange 
rates” (Fry 1995: 20). In other words, financial repression – a combination of 
heavy taxation, interest rate controls and government participation in the 
credit-allocation process - would lead to both a decrease in the depth of the 
financial system and a loss of efficiency with which savings are intermediated 
(Sen and Vaidya 1997). The proponents of financial reform argued that 
financial liberalization tends to raise ratios of domestic private savings to 
income (Shaw 1973). Therefore, it would lead to significant economic benefits 
through more effective domestic saving mobilization, financial deepening and 
efficient resource allocation. The core argument of the McKinnon-Shaw thesis 
is that savings are assumed to be positively related to the real rate of interest, 
and that an administratively determined nominal interest rates holds the real 
interest rate below its market equilibrium level. The theory of financial 
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liberalization (McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973) also contends that savings will be 
allocated and invested more efficiently in a liberalized environment with 
financial intermediation, than when savings are invested directly in the sector in 
which it takes place, without financial intermediation. 
There are a number of caveats to the Mckinnon-Shaw hypothesis. First, as 
pointed out by Thirlwall (2005), the rise in real interest rates after liberalization 
will make wealth holders richer and they may choose to save a lower 
proportion of their income. Thus, a rise in interest rates may induce a wealth 
effect away from savings, even if there is a positive substitution effect towards 
more bank deposit saving. Secondly, saving may be mainly out of profit 
income; this Kaldorian view is discussed in Stockhammer (1999). If this is the 
case, then most productive investment is mainly out of retained profits. 
Thirdly, and in our view most importantly, are portfolio decisions regarding 
the composition of savings after liberalization. Most official private savings data is 
based on investment data, and not other forms of saving which can include 
unofficial stores of value in informal markets. Financial liberalization may not 
encourage investors to offload these informal assets in favour of stores of 
value such as bank deposits which enhance financial intermediation.    
We turn to the motivating model for the econometric estimations below. 
Our framework uses Tobin’s (1969) portfolio-balance model to analyse the 
choices that agents make in holding domestic currency deposits versus 
alternative stores of value (such as precious metals, foreign currency, and other 
hedges). While it is not a theory about changes to the supply of savings, it is a 
theory about its allocation and the extent of formal sector financial 
intermediation. It is based upon the classic Tobin (1969) multi-asset or 
portfolio-balance model. In this setting, various assets are gross substitutes for 
each other, provided there are three or more assets. The analysis in this section 
also draws on Taylor’s (1983, chapter 5) extension of the Tobin model for 
developing countries. In a setting of several assets much hinges on the relative 
substitutability among different assets that are gross substitutes.  
Following Taylor (1983, chapter 5) total wealth (W) is composed of three 
assets: physical capital (K), domestic money (H) and ‘gold’ (Z) which is a hybrid 
asset (consisting of such items as precious metals, foreign currency, other 
informal sector investments): 
ZPHPKW z++=       (1) 
P and Pz represent the market prices of capital and ‘gold’ respectively. 
Equation (1) corresponds to the adding-up condition for total wealth, where 
the sum of the partial derivatives with respect to wealth must equal unity. The 
stock of capital (K) is fixed during the period of analysis.  
H is high-powered money, equivalent to commercial bank reserves. For 
the sake of simplicity, commercial banks are assumed to lend only to firms to 
finance working capital (Q). But the public deposit money with banks (DP), as 
do firms (Df). Thus deposits with banks’ are: 
QDDDcH ffp =+= ),(      (2) 
Q represents financing of working capital, the purchase of intermediate 
inputs and the payment of wages by firms’ in a cash-in-advance situation, and c 
represents the central bank imposed reserve requirements on bank deposits, c 
< 1. Bank loans take the form of advances to firms. Firms also borrow from 
the informal ‘gold’ market.  
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A key feature of the model is that the interest rate (r) that clears the 
market for bank loans (made only to firms) is endogenous, whereas the interest 
rate on deposits in banks (rd) is an exogenous parameter. The important point 
is that an increase in r is akin to financial deepening as it signifies a greater 
volume of bank intermediation. On the other hand, raising the deposit rate is 
equivalent to financial liberalization, and should induce new commercial bank 
entry. There could, however, be a greater risk associated with a higher deposit 
rate (ρ) accompanying financial liberalization due to the lack of appropriate 
prudential bank regulation and other political uncertainties. The demand 
function for deposits made by the public may take the form: 
WrrhD dp ),,( πρ−=       (3) 
The public holds a fraction of total wealth in bank deposits, whose real 
return is rd - πh (monetary inflation). The parameter π represents the relative 
appreciation of the value of ‘gold’, πz relative to monetary inflation πh: π = πz – 
πh. We postulate that h1 < 0, the partial derivative of the demand for deposits is 
negatively related to loan market clearing rate, as household wealth holders 
lend directly to firms. The partial derivative with respect to the deposit rate is 
normally positive (h2 > 0), moderated by a risk factor. The demand for deposits 
with banks will be declining in the relative rate of ‘gold’ appreciation, h3 < 0. 
Equilibrium in the loan market (zero excess demand) takes the following 
form:  
0),,( =−+−
c
HQWrrh d πρ      (4) 
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The first term represents the public’s demand for deposits in the commercial 
banking sector, the second term firms’ working capital advances from banks 
that are re-deposited less supply (the last term). The loan market clears in the 
loan interest rate r, which rises with excess demand and vice-versa. 
In the ‘gold’ market equilibrium (demand minus supply with Pz rising in 
response to excess demand and vice-versa) takes the following form: 
0),,( =−− ZPWrrg zd πρ      (5) 
The g(.) function represents demand for ‘gold’. We would expect the demand 
for ‘gold’ to fall as the loan rates rises (g1 < 0), also for demand to rise as the 
asset is expected to appreciate in value (g3 > 0), but we postulate that g2 is 
ambiguous in sign. 
The equilibrium condition for the third asset can be dropped by Walras’s 
law. Totally differentiating (4) and (5) and arranging the results in matrix form 
we obtain: 
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The trace of the Jacobian is –1 + h1W < 0, and the determinant (DET) = –h1W 
> 0. Therefore, the model is stable.  
We are now in a position to carry out some comparative statics exercises 
around an increase in the deposit rate, which is equivalent to financial 
liberalization.  
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An increase in the deposit rate will increase the market clearing loan rate 
in the new equilibrium; see (7). As far as the equilibrium price of ‘gold’ is 
concerned (8) we expect it to fall in the ‘normal’ case, if g2 < 0. This means that 
as the deposit rate increases, there is a movement away from both ‘gold’ and 
capital towards bank deposits. This represents normality, and is more likely to 
be the case in more stable societies that are on a sustained high growth path. If, 
however, g2 > 0, it implies that increases in deposit rates encourage more ‘gold’ 
holdings, and if h2 < 0, implying that an increase in the deposit rate is 
accompanied by a more than proportionate perception in the risk of bank 
deposits, then the ‘price’ of ‘gold’ might rise reflecting excess demand for this 
asset. In this case the effect of financial sector liberalization upon financial 
intermediation (more bank deposits) is more muted. Most importantly, the 
holding of the hybrid informal sector asset, ‘gold’, may not augment reported 
savings as it does not always enter official investment data.  
3 Empirical evidence 
Two main issues need to be addressed to examine the impact of financial 
liberalization hypothesis: first, do real interest rates significantly affect domestic 
private savings, and second, which form of financial deepening seems to be 
most relevant: is it the number of financial institutions or the volume of 
financial assets relative to the size of the economy? We argue that liberalization 
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leads to an expansion in both areas. Other studies (Chowdhury, 2001) 
construct an ordinal index of liberalization policies, but such indices, akin to 
dummy variables, have their limitations, as well as truncating the data and 
reducing degrees of freedom.    
 
Model Specification: Savings Function 
To examine the impact of financial liberalization on savings behaviour due to  
financial deepening measured by broad money as a percentage of GDP 
(M2/GDP) or the expansion of banking institutions (measured by bank 
branches), two models are considered: 
υαααα ++++= pcigdpmrdrSP 3210 )/2()(     (9) 
εββββ ++++= pcibankbrrdrSP 3210 )(                (10) 
Where,  = Domestic private savings as a percentage of GDP (defined as 
private domestic investment plus the trade surplus), RDR= Real deposit 
interest rate, m2/gdp = broad money as a percentage of GDP Bankbr = Bank 
branch institutions, pci = percentage change (log) in per capita income and 
pS
υ and ε are error terms. 
  
Rationale for the Variables  
The inclusion of real deposit interest rate is standard in the savings 
literature, particularly when the financial liberalization thesis is tested, which 
suggests private domestic savings rises in response to increases in the real 
interest rate. The real deposit interest rate is defined as at least a 12 month time 
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deposit rate minus inflation. Another explanatory variable, number of bank 
branches has been used as a proxy of expansion of financial institutions since 
the empirical evidence (Fry, 1995:467) suggests that this is an important 
determinant of estimating institutional access to private saving. Also, broad 
money as a percentage of GDP (M2/GDP) is an indicator of financial 
deepening/development, and may augment savings. The inclusion of real per 
capita income growth is also standard in the savings literature because savings 
is directly associated with output through investment, although the impact of 
income on savings has been inconclusive (Chowdhury 2001). 
Since the study uses time series data for the period, 1981-2008, the data 
might be non-stationary in character. If the data generating process of the 
dependent and the explanatory variables are non-stationary, spurious 
correlations can occur. This means that the regression equation with non-
stationary time series variables may have a higher R square value combined 
with a low Durbin-Watson statistic, and also is likely to be statistically 
significant when they are virtually not (Gujarati 2003:806). In order to avoid 
such misleading statistical inferences, unit root augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) tests need to be done for all the variables under investigation in order 
to check whether the variables have non-stationary data generating processes. 
Estimation : Co integration and Error Correction Model 
To test the presence of non-stationarity in the variables, unit root test (ADF 
test) has been done for each of the variables under investigation (Annex I). 
The result suggests that variables are non stationary in levels but stationary at 
first difference (graphs are in appendix A and B). i.e., variables used in the 
model have the order of integration I (1) which becomes order of I (0) at first 
difference. Therefore, the Engle and Granger Technique (1987) suggests for 
co-integration analysis. 
If the variables under investigation are found co-integrated, there exists 
a long run relationship between the variables. Therefore, OLS estimation 
would not be valid since the residual used in the estimation needs correction. 
In the presence of co integration, the theorem of Engle Granger (1987) can be 
used to show an Error Correction Model (ECM). Therefore, models (equation 
9 and 10) need to be modified including an error correction term (ec), with 
variables at first difference, which are noted below:  
υααααα +++++= −143210 )()/2()( tP ecpcidgdpmdrdrddS                                 
                                                                                                        (11) 
εβββββ +++++= −143210 )()()( tP ecpcidbankbrdrdrddS                                    
                                                                                                             (12) 
Where,  is the lagged residual from the co integrating regression.  1−tec
 
Error Correction Model (Equation-11) 
Applying OLS in estimating equation (9) with the variables in levels, the 
predicted error term is found stationary (significant at 10 percent, Annex II). 
As such, the variables under investigation are co-integrated and there exists a 
long-run relationship between private domestic savings and other explanatory 
variables. This suggests an Error Correction Model (ECM); regressing private 
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domestic savings on explanatory variables (at first difference) and lag (one 
period) residual (Annex III). 
The estimated savings function is noted below: 
29.0,31.001.0227.012.071.0 2 =−+−+= RecpcigdpmrdrSP  
         (13) 
The estimated equation reveals that is (delete) a positive relationship 
between real deposit interest rate and domestic private savings, but the 
magnitude of the coefficient is small ( =1α 0.12), and also the coefficient is 
statistically insignificant (p value is 0.15, Annex-III). The negative relationship 
between financial deepening (m2/gdp) and private domestic savings reveals the 
fact that private savings might not respond to the financial development in 
certain developing countries. Indeed, the coefficient is also statistically 
insignificant (p-value is 0.25, Annex-III).  The estimated coefficient for per 
capita income is positive, but the coefficient is also statistically insignificant (p 
value 0.63, Annex-III). The magnitude of the error correction (ec) coefficient 
suggests that 31 percent deviation corrects in each turn to reach the long-run 
equilibrium or stability, and this has been found statistically significant at 5 
percent level. (p-value  0.05, Annex-III)  
 
Error Correction Model (Equation-12) 
Applying OLS in estimating equation (10) with the variables in levels, the 
predicted error term is found stationary (significant at 5 percent, Annex IV). 
Again, the variables under investigation are co-integrated and a long-run 
relationship exists between the private domestic savings and other explanatory 
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variables. Again, an ECM procedure is called for, regressing private domestic 
savings on explanatory variables (at first difference) and lag (one period) 
residual (Annex V). 
The estimated savings function is noted below: 
 
34.0,36.0002.0003.008.073.0 2 =−−−+= RecpcibankbrrdrSP  (14) 
There is a positive relationship between the real deposit interest rate 
and domestic private savings, but the magnitude of the coefficient is small 
( =1β 0.08) and insignificant (p value is 0.27, Annex-V). The negative 
relationship between financial institutions (bankbr) and private domestic 
savings reveals the fact that private savings might not respond to the expansion 
in the number of financial institutions. The coefficient is also statistically 
insignificant (p-value is 0.29, Annex-V).  The estimated coefficient for per-
capita income also depicts a negative responsiveness of savings with the 
income, but the result is statistically insignificant (p value 0.94, Annex-V). The 
magnitude of the error correction (ec) coefficient suggests that 36 percent 
deviation corrects in each turn to reach the long-run equilibrium or stability, 
and this has been found statistically significant at 5 percent level. (p-value  0.02, 
Annex-V)  
  
Therefore, no systematic pattern or relationship can be drawn from the 
regression results. However, due to insufficient observations, and also loss of 
degrees of freedom with the data at first difference, further econometric 
analyses, such as VECM (vector error correction models) cannot be explored. 
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At least three possible explanations for the negative or insignificant 
relation between the savings ratio and interest rates may be suggested. First, 
wealth effects that reduce saving may outweigh substitution effect towards 
saving following a rise in deposit rates; second, there may be very little 
substitution between financial and real assets, as highlighted in the theoretical 
model above; and thirdly if higher real interest rates are associated with a 
higher ratio of foreign capital flows to GDP, which in accounting terms leads 
to a lower domestic savings ratio, if part of the capital inflows are consumed. 
Another empirical study of Bangladesh (Chowdhury 2001) on private savings 
also found a negative relationship between private savings and real interest 
rates during the post-reform period. 
4 Financial Liberalization in Bangladesh 
From the mid 1970s onwards many developing countries, most notably in 
Latin America (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Chile) 
and Asia (e.g., Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, India, Sri Lanka, 
Philippines and Pakistan), implemented various Financial Sector Reform 
Programmes (FSRPs). In Bangladesh financial reforms started in the 1980s. 
This process had a number of phases. The measures that have already been 
taken under the programme include the introduction of a market determined 
interest rate, privatization of state-owned commercial banks and greater 
freedom for the operation of private sector commercial banks and other 
financial institutions. The total number of banks increased from 15 to 48 
during the period 1980 to 2005. Although the financial sector, particularly the 
banking sector, expanded with the passage of time, the savings rate in 
 16
Bangladesh has not improved compared to other Asian developing countries. 
Table 1 presents a cross-country comparison of savings as a percentage of 
GDP: 
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Table 1  
Gross Domestic Savings as a percentage of GDP: Selected Asian Countries 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Bangladesh 2.1 8.6 9.6 12.6 17.8 18.1 
China 35.0 34.4 39.9 44.1 37.5 49.0 
India 15.5 21.2 22.6 25.3 24.0 29.7 
Indonesia 38.0 29.7 32.3 30.6 32.8 26.6 
Malaysia 29.8 29.9 34.5 39.7 47.3 43.5 
Pakistan 6.9 5.9 11.1 15.8 16.1 12.2 
Sri Lanka 11.2 10.2 13.8 15.3 17.4 14.6 
Thailand 22.9 25.5 33.8 35.4 31.5 30.1 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2007 
 
In Bangladesh, according to its Central bank, total deposits as a percentage 
of GDP increased from 30 percent in 1990 to 41 percent in 2008. Table 2 
shows a comparison with Asian economies of the monetization of the 
economy, measured by broad money (M2) as a percentage of GDP. Again, 
Bangladesh lags behind other Asian economies, besides war-torn Sri Lanka.  
Table 2 
Trends in Financial Development (M2/GDP): Selected Asian Economies 
   
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Bangladesh 13.1 19.1 22.3 27.4 31.9 41.2 
China 33.2 47.3 70.3 88.5 129.5 150.6 
India 32.8 37.5 39.9 42.0 52.0 62.2 
Indonesia 13.3 21.4 34.2 43.3 50.0 40.9 
Malaysia 71.2 108.0 89.4 106.6 121.6 124.8 
Pakistan 38.7 38.0 37.1 40.9 36.8 45.2 
Sri Lanka 28.4 29.4 25.9 33.7 36.2 39.9 
Thailand 38.2 58.9 68.4 78.6 111.9 104.7 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2007 
 
Operational Efficiency 
The main indicator of operational efficiency is the minimization of 
intermediation cost, the interest rate spread (IRS) between loan and deposit 
rates. A low IRS is vital for the efficiency and competitiveness of the financial 
system (Ahmed and Islam 2006b). Historically, developing countries with 
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financial imperfections have been characterised by higher spreads due to 
factors such as absence of competition, burden of non-performing loans 
(NPLs), high administrative costs, etc. (Islam and Begum, 2004) 
Competition among banks is also seen as a desired outcome of the 
liberalization process. However, there seems to be limits to the beneficial 
effects of competition for operational efficiency. This is because of economies 
of scale and scope in banking (Dijkstra 1996). For small banks it is impossible 
to have an extensive branch network which is necessary to attract deposits. 
They also have more problems in spreading lending risks through 
diversification, and tend to be dependent on a few borrowers. In other cases, it 
is more profitable to offer a range of banking services instead of just a few 
products, but this also requires larger banks. In fact, there is a rather complex 
relationship between competition and operational efficiency. If competition 
increases, operational efficiency first increases (as costs decrease), but after a 
certain point, operational efficiency of banks decreases (Dijkstra 1996). Indeed, 
optimum competition depends on the size of the market. Financial 
intermediaries can substantially reduce transaction costs, developing expertise 
and also take advantage of economics of scale (Mishkin 2007). Apart from this, 
the use of technology in banking services is another element which influences 
efficiency and optimal scale as well. 
In Bangladesh, the IRS has been persistently high over the years, which 
basically indicates a high cost of financial intermediation. The resulting high 
cost of borrowing discourages private investment, and also puts strains on the 
government by increasing the cost of servicing public borrowing (Ahmed and 
Islam 2006a). Indeed, there has been some improvement in reducing 
intermediation costs in Bangladesh, but still the spread is higher than in 
neighbouring countries, for example, India (Table 3) 
Table 3 
 Interest Rate Spread of Selected South Asian Countries 
Year India Bangladesh  Sri Lanka Pakistan 
2003 6.09 6.11  3.68 6.63 
2004 5.17 5.27  4.86 5.46 
2005 4.50 5.38  5.93 6.83 
2006 4.75 5.61  7.14 6.43 
2007 4.25 5.98  … 5.14 
Source: Publications of respective Central Banks 
 
Interestingly, the IRS in private sector banking, both foreign (FCBs) and 
domestic (PCBs) banks, is higher than state-owned development banks (DFIs) 
in Bangladesh, (Figure 1). 
Figure 1  
Interest Rate Spread  by Types of Banks 
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Source: Statistics Department, Bangladesh Bank 
Note: NCBs= Nationalized Commercial Banks, PCBs= Private Commercial Banks, FCBs= Foreign 
Commercial Banks, DFIs= State-owned Specialized (Development) Banks 
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Allocative Efficiency 
The allocation of financial resources is not yet efficient in Bangladesh. Term 
loans as a percentage of total loan portfolios of the banking sector have been 
only around 4 to 5 percent until 2007. However, the proportion increased to 
7.86 percent in 2008 (Table 4). 
Table 4 
 Term Loan as a percentage of Total loan portfolio 
FY Term loan/ Total Loan Portfolio 
2003 2.81 
2004 4.35 
2005 4.97 
2006 4.29 
2007 5.43 
2008 7.86 
Source: Statistics Department, Bangladesh Bank 
 
Furthermore, for a proper analysis of allocative efficiency, term loans 
should be disaggregated in respect of its tenure to observe the availability of 
loanable funds for long term investment. But due to the lack of adequate data 
this feature cannot be explained. However, the disaggregated data on term loan 
disbursements by the types of banks reveals that state owned development 
banks mainly provide term loans to productive investment compared to private 
sector commercial banks, especially foreign multinational banks, (Figure 2). 
  
Figure 2  
Term loans by Bank Type 
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 Source: Statistics Department, Bangladesh Bank 
Note: NCBs= Nationalized Commercial Banks, PCBs= Private Commercial Banks, FCBs= Foreign 
Commercial Banks, SBIs= State-owned Specialized (Development) Banks 
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The study finds that the financial liberalization policies in Bangladesh have not 
delivered the expected outcome on savings as suggested by the McKinnon-
Shaw hypothesis. It is evident from the econometric analysis that no systematic 
relationship exists between real deposit interest rate and domestic private 
savings. One possible explanation, in accounting terms, is that capital inflows, 
especially the development assistance component, are monetized and 
consumed thereby depressing aggregate savings. This still leaves us with two 
other possible channels that may be responsible for financial liberalization not 
augmenting private savings as a proportion of national income. 
First of all the institutional environment may discourage asset swaps away 
from certain assets, described as the hybrid asset ‘gold’ in our theoretical 
portfolio balance model above. The important point being that these assets do 
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not enter the official savings data as they are not part of investment. This is 
more likely in an uncertain institutional environment. Addison, Chowdhury 
and Murshed (2002) point out that poor general governance and the presence 
of civil war (political instability) discourage financial deepening. In Bangladesh 
the regulatory framework is weak. Also, the asset portfolios of banks in 
Bangladesh are also plagued by toxic loans given out as a result of the process 
of political patronage, and this is a real problem relative to other developing 
countries (Chowdhury, 2001).  Secondly, the experience of Bangladesh may 
reflect the fact that liberalization makes savers wealthier, and they consume 
more, depressing savings. In our view, the first effect, pertaining to 
institutional factors, may be more relevant in Bangladesh. 
Efficiency in the banking sector leaves much to be desired. There are 
major concerns regarding the prudential regulation of banks, related to capital 
adequacy and loan loss provision that are highlighted in Chowdhury (2001). 
Banking institutions are still running inefficiently in terms of operations and 
allocation of financial resources. Financial intermediation costs are very high, 
as private sector banks charge excessively to finance investment. Also, only 4 
to 5 percent of total bank loan portfolios were disbursed as term loans until 
2007, and private sector banks, particularly foreign banks, hardly disburse any 
term loans. Although financial liberalization calls for privatization and the 
opening up of the financial market to private sector banking, the Bangladeshi 
evidence suggests that state owned banks, particularly development banks are 
still vital in providing investment finance to the productive sector. All in all, 
financial liberalization in Bangladesh may be yet another case of a bridge too 
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far, as highlighted by Caprio, Honohan and Stiglitz (2001) on excessively hasty 
banking deregulation and financial liberalization.  
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Appendix - B : Variables in First difference 
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Annex I 
Unit Root Test (ADF Test)  
 
Before modelling the relationship, the data generating process of the variables 
(existence of unit roots) is subjected to the Augmented Dicky Fuller (ADF) 
Test. The null hypothesis ( ) is that variables under investigation have a unit 
root; means series is a non stationary process, against the alternative ( ) is 
stationary.  
0H
1H
 
Table 
Unit root test results (ADF Test) 
Variables levels levels (with trend)
       First   Differ-
ence(Δ ) 
Sp -0.566 -3.305* -5.001*** 
rdr -2.326 -2.053 -5.516*** 
bankbr 
m2gdp 
pci 
-1.613 
1.514 
     -5.111*** 
-2.411 
-0.555 
     -5.053*** 
       -2.347 
       -3.066** 
-7.615*** 
Note: (1) Critical values of ADF statistic for levels at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance are 
(-) 3.736, (-) 2.994, and (-) 2.628 (without trend) respectively. 
(2) Critical values of ADF statistic for levels at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance are (-) 
4.362, (-) 3.592, and (-) 3.235 (with trend) respectively.  
(3)Critical values of ADF statistics at first difference at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
are (-) 3.743, (-) 2.997 and (-) 2.629 respectively.   
(4) *** is 1%,** is 5% and * means 10% level of significance 
 
The above mentioned table reveals that the hypothesis ( ) of unit roots 
in the variables in levels cannot be rejected at 1% and 5% level of significance, 
which proves a non-stationary process of the variables in levels (except per 
capita income, pci). On the other hand, ADF tests for unit roots for all the 
variables in first difference (except bankbr) are integrated of order zero (i.e., 
stationary process) since they are statistically significant at 1% and 5% and 10% 
level of significance. If we plot the variables in levels and first difference we get 
the graphs in appendix A and B. 
0H
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Annex II 
Co-integration Analysis: Engle and Granger (1987) Technique 
 
We estimate equation (9) applying OLS method and predict the residual. After 
doing the unit root test (ADF test) of the predicted residual, we find it 
stationary at 10 percent level of significance (since p-value is 0.07) 
 
Table 
Unit root test results (ADF Test) 
 
Test Statistic 
 
P- value 
 
Predicted residual 
(error term) 
-2.67 0.07* 
Note: (1) Critical values of ADF statistic for levels at 1%, 5% and 10% significance are (-) 
3.736, (-)2.994, and (-) 2.628(without trend) respectively. 
(2) *** is 1% ,** is 5% and * means 10% level of significance 
 
 
Since the predicted residual for the linear relationship (equation-9) of the 
variable is stationary at 10 percent level of significance (p-value is 0.07), the 
variables are co-integrated and there exists a long-run relationship between 
private domestic saving (as a percentage of GDP) and the other explanatory 
variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex III 
Error Correction Model (equation-11) 
 
Using Error Correction Model (ECM), regressing private domestic savings on 
explanatory variables (at first difference) and lag (one period) residual: 
 
Table  
Dependent Variable: Private Domestic Savings  
 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
t statistic 
(p value) 
 
0α  0.71 
(0.32) 
2.17 
(0.04) 
1α  0.12 
(0.08) 
1.51 
(0.15) 
2α   
 
      3α   
-0.27 
(0.23) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-1.79 
(0.25) 
0.49 
(0.63) 
 
4α  -0.31 
(0.15) 
-2.10 
(0.05) 
R-squared 0.29  
No. of obs. 27  
          Note:  Estimated at 5% level of significance (95% confidence interval) 
 
The above mentioned table reveals very weak relationship between real 
deposit rate and domestic private savings (since the magnitude of the 
coefficient, =1α 0.12) and also corresponding t statistic and p value suggest 
that the relationship is statistically insignificant (p value is 0.15). The model 
however, explains 29% of the total variation in annual domestic private savings 
(R-squared= 0.29). 
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Annex IV 
Co-integration Analysis: Engle and Granger (1987) Technique 
 
We estimate equation (10) applying OLS method and predict the residual. 
After doing the unit root test (ADF test) of the predicted residual, we find it 
stationary at 5 percent level of significance (since p-value is 0.03) 
 
Table 
Unit root test results (ADF Test) 
 
Test Statistic 
 
P- value 
 
Predicted residual 
(error term) 
-3.09 0.03** 
Note: (1) Critical values of ADF statistic for levels at 1%, 5% and 10% significance are (-) 
3.736, (-)2.994, and (-) 2.628(without trend) respectively. 
(2) *** is 1% ,** is 5% and * means 10% level of significance 
 
 
Since the predicted residual for the linear relationship (equation-10) of the 
variable is stationary at 5 percent level of significance (p-value is 0.03), the 
variables are co-integrated and a long-run relationship exists between private 
domestic saving (as a percentage of GDP) and the other explanatory variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Annex V 
Error Correction Model (equation-12) 
 
Using Error Correction Model (ECM), regressing private domestic savings on 
explanatory variables (at first difference) and lag (one period) residual: 
 
Table  
Dependent Variable: Private Domestic Savings  
 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
t statistic 
(p value) 
 
0β  0.73 
(0.35) 
2.08 
(0.05) 
1β  0.08 
(0.07) 
1.12 
(0.27) 
2β  
 
3β  
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(.03) 
-1.08 
(0.29) 
-0.08 
(0.94) 
 
4β  
 
-0.36 
(0.14) 
 
-2.64 
(0.02) 
R-squared 0.34  
No. of obs. 27  
Note:  Estimated at 5% level of significance (95% confidence interval) 
 
The above mentioned table reveals a weak relationship between real 
deposit rate and domestic private savings (since the magnitude of the 
coefficient, 1β =-0.08) and also the corresponding t statistic and p values 
suggest that the relationship is statistically insignificant (p value is 0.27). The 
model however, explains 34% of the total variation in annual domestic private 
savings (R-squared= 0.34). 
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